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Abstract 
This paper examines setbacks in the early growth of new firms.  Growth interruptions mark the 
unfolding, cumulative processes of firm growth overlooked in standard studies that use cross 
sectional methods.  To probe for possible patterns in growth setbacks, we examined a cohort of 
200 high technology firms founded in about 1990 and analysed the growth paths of survivors.  
Simple compression techniques yielded seven types of growth turning points.  Growth setbacks 
are the norm even among firms with better growth records.  Growth crises can be represented as 
a shift in phase state.  To understand what such a shift implies, we focus on the micro-evidence 
relevant to processes of firm growth and illustrate growth crises from case studies.  Growth crises 
represent both limits to knowledge and the means by which knowledge is revised and learning 
accelerated in the firm. 
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Introduction 
New technology based firms “are business experiments, founded on conjectures that may or 
may not turn out to be valid.  Their fortunes are inherently unpredictable...” 
[Metcalfe 2000 p. 7] 
Growth crises in new firms demonstrate the limits to practical knowledge and challenge our 
abstract knowledge.  Are there recurring patterns in firms’ early growth setbacks?  Why do they 
occur and with what consequences? 
Consider the following scenario.  A new enterprise has been performing well, though only five 
years old.  Its growth record is impressive, measured in terms of sales and revenues as well as 
employee numbers.  Early success makes it possible to expand further through retained earnings 
and externally obtained funds.  Resource providers view its prospects favourably.  Morale is 
excellent among its members whose intensive efforts have contributed to the firm’s performance 
and who have good prospects of rewards if this is sustained.  One of its members has to take 
prolonged leave for personal reasons.  Six months later he returns from abroad to find the 
situation transformed.  Sales are down and unsold stocks have built up.  The banks have 
withdrawn loan facilities.  Creditors are demanding payment.  There have been lay-offs and more 
are expected.  The enterprise faces an enforced sell-out or bankruptcy. 
A sudden shift in phase state is typical of complex dynamic systems where the effects of change 
are not additive.  As interlinked elements alter at the micro level, they have knock-on effects 
which can shift the internal coherence, structure and performance of the whole system, sometimes 
quite rapidly.  Firms are subject to complex dynamic processes.  Growing firms experiencing 
setbacks are liable to crises through the amplification effects of feedback.  The prevalence of 
setbacks is a measure of new firms’ vulnerability. 
Cumulative processes inherent in firm growth cannot be tapped by the cross sectional 
methodologies dominant in the literature.  For example, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI, 1997) study of high performance high technology firms in 1997 took as its criterion for 
inclusion among Tech Stars (fast growth firms) those reaching £1 million turnover within three 
years.  But this encompasses a group of firms highly heterogeneous in their activities, with diverse 
resource endowments and requirements, about which it is difficult to make meaningful 
generalizations as to the achievement represented by a given level of turnover.1  However, this 
choice of indicator did indirectly acknowledge that the more common use of firms’ rate of growth 
over a few years is an inadequate measure of a young firm's cumulative achievements, which are 
not captured in many 'fast track' indices and aggregate studies based on growth rates.   
In this paper we investigate interruptions in the early growth of new firms, viewed as a challenge 
to knowledge and practice.  In the first part, we ask why the issue has not been addressed directly 
in the mainstream literature on firm growth.  There is extensive indirect evidence of early growth 
interruptions and reversals in quantitative research, while case studies provide direct evidence.  To 
probe for the prevalence of growth setbacks, in the second part of the paper we examine a cohort 
of 200 high technology firms founded in about 1990 and analyse the growth paths of survivors.  
Simple compression techniques reveal patterns and turning points in the firm's growth paths.  
                                                
1 Resource requirements and availability for a given type of activity, and extent of outsourcing should be taken into account 
when assessing the achievement represented by growth of turnover.  
 
Garnsey and Heffernan 2003 CTM WP2003/01 
5 
Setbacks are the norm even among firms with a largely successful growth record.  In the third part 
of the paper we focus on micro-evidence on growth setbacks since it is at this level that causal 
factors can be ascertained. 
Growth Setbacks in Rapid Growth Firms – a neglected issue 
Rapid growth ventures are the favourites of investors and policy-makers.  They are equated with 
the elite group of firms that offer massive returns on investment and from which the major 
employment-creators will be drawn.  Fewer than five per cent of new ventures are reputed to 
provide investors with ninety percent of their returns.  Fewer than five per cent of a cohort of new 
firms create over fifty percent of jobs ten years after start-up [Storey 1994; Kirchoff, 1994].  Fast 
Track Indexes are compiled to identify these fast growth favourites [Storey, 1997; Virgin 100 
Fast Track Index].  However, rapid growth databases do not follow the subsequent progress of 
their early prize winners.  Typically they track only three or four years’ recent growth.  But more 
firms achieve fast track status for a period than become industry leaders and a large proportion of 
the early favourites later experience a decline in growth rate.2  This includes UK companies 
identified as the ten per cent most successful and promising among over 7000 on the basis of their 
growth record.3  
Growth interruptions and crises have not been directly addressed in leading studies on enterprise 
growth.  For example the topic of growth interruptions and growth reversal is not included in 
influential studies of firm growth and development conducted by Bhidé 2000, Storey 1994, Oakey 
1994, Kirchoff 1994 or Audretsch 1994.4  Yet these are inevitable concomitants of the widely-
cited figures on firms’ aggregate growth performance which show that:   
1. A minority of new firms survive at all beyond the early growth of their first five years. 
2. A large proportion of surviving new firms fail to expand beyond a small size after a 
period of early growth sufficient to ensure survival. 
3. Among the minority of firms with an early growth record, only a few firms sustain 
growth sufficiently to become industry leaders [Stanley et al., 1996; Baldwin, 1995; 
Audretsch, 1994; Kirchoff, 1994 Storey, 1994 5]. 
                                                
2 Nevertheless, if more new firms grew to a higher average size, the employment consequences would be considerable.   
 
3 “It may be thought surprising” that a number of this elite “experienced very slow growth or even declining sales” at the end 
of the four year period during which they were studied.  14 per cent were classed as “temporary fast growers” on this basis 
[Storey 1997 vol. 2 p. 6].  Had the sample extended beyond the top ten percent and over a longer period than four years, it can 
be conjectured that the proportion of "temporary fast growers" would have been higher than 14 per cent. 
4 Some authors acknowledge the volatility of growth performance: “The 1980s saw many firms show spectacular growth only to 
be followed by precipitate decline.” [Barkham 1996, p 4].  But this is attributed to external conditions. 
5 The most comprehensive evidence is presented by Kirchoff 1994.  About 800,000 new US firms were formed in 1977-8, as 
shown in the Small Business Administration database.  Sixty per cent of these firms terminated as a continuing unit within the 
first six years; these included most of the new firms that contracted in size.  Many of the surviving firms were "plateau" firms 
(38 per cent of survivors showing no change in size) while fewer than half of surviving firms (46 per cent) showed growth in 
employee numbers [Kirchoff, 1994, p.184].  As regards employment creation, in the cohort as a whole, it was the four per cent 
of highest growth firms formed in 1977-8 that created 74 per cent of employment growth in the whole cohort of firms six years 
later [Kirchoff, 1994, p.186].  All available studies show that sustained job growth is concentrated in a small group of firms in 
a designated cohort.  The longer the period studied, "... the more concentrated is employment creation in a small number of 
firms" [Storey, 1994, p. 118].  UK studies found that under five per cent of a cohort of new firms provided over fifty per cent of 
all jobs in those firms ten years later [Storey et al., 1987, p. 152; cf. Cosh and Hughes, 1996, p. 11].  
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Aggregate studies use predominantly cross sectional methods of analysis and do not examine 
evidence on firms’ growth trajectories.  Where panel data provide evidence by age of firm on 
survival and failure, this has not been used to examine growth paths or the timing of growth 
interruptions and reversals.  Many studies have identified obstacles to growth, but in providing a 
disconnected list of obstacles and determinants, or classifying constraints by internal versus 
external causes, this literature does not address the causes of syndromes which drive growth 
crises.  Interpretation of these data requires a conceptual scheme and evidence at the level of the 
firm. 
In economic studies on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) there is an absence of 
explanatory models to filter observations at the micro level on growth interruptions and guide the 
framing of questions and interpretation of findings.  Qualitative studies of firm growth in 
organisational studies have shown greater recognition of growth interruptions and crises than 
quantitative studies in industrial economics.6  Some life cycle models of firm growth see 
transitions as marked by major growth problems.  In particular, in a classic paper by Greiner, the 
new firm is viewed as going through a series of transitions, in which evolution alternates with 
revolution in a process reminiscent of punctuated equilibrium theories [Greiner 1974].  The 
transitions are marked by crises of growth.  However Greiner’s analysis was concerned with the 
transitions corporations undergo over the long term and paid only passing attention to early 
growth crises.  These are of particular interest because of their onset while conditions are 
formative and the new firm is vulnerable.  They can have a critical impact on firm survival and 
emergent industry leadership.    
The managerial literature on stages of growth has been subject to considerable criticism [Storey 
1994; Bhidé 2000].  These critiques have overlooked the extent to which early problem-solving 
has sequential dimensions in the new firm.  Though stages of growth are not invariant, new firms 
go through early developmental processes [Garnsey 2001].  A drawback to growth stage theories 
is the absence of a theory of the firm or its co-evolution with others.  This has reduced the 
contribution that the study of internal transitions might have provided to other work on firm 
growth. 
In conventional economic theory on firm growth there is still “… no notion of an internal process 
of developments leading to cumulative movements…” [Penrose 1959 p.1].  The resource-based 
approach to the firm, increasingly influential in the strategy literature, avoids many of these 
shortcomings.  Penrose viewed firm growth as “a process of development … in which an 
interacting series of internal changes leads to increases in size accompanied by changes in (firm) 
characteristics”.  Quantitative economic studies on firm growth lack the holistic concept of the 
firm adopted by Penrose.7 
Aggregate data on firm growth are relevant to establishing whether typical growth paths can be 
identified and how common these are.  These are needed to situate the experience of growth 
setbacks in particular firms.  We wanted to trace the measurable “tracks” of firms' growth over 
time, since firm growth is path dependent and reflects cumulative processes.  Turning points or 
inflexion points in a firm's growth are of particular interest as evidence of growth setbacks. 
                                                
6 Crises of growth among firms are even viewed as inevitable in some qualitative studies [Slatter, 1992; Kotter and Sathe, 
1978]. 
7 The Penrosean approach is congruent with critical perspectives on complexity [McGlade, 2001].  The emerging firm can be 
viewed as a complex dynamic system, shaped by initial conditions, growing through path dependent processes, active in a 
turbulent environment and so subject to chance perturbations [Garnsey 1998].  The firm is activated by agents whose cognitive 
maps of their own system and its environment motivate their actions. 
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A broader methodological concern is to find ways to align studies of internal growth processes in 
new firms with aggregate studies of new firm growth patterns.  In what follows, our aim is to 
signal the relevance of studying growth as a cumulative process and to indicate on a preliminary 
basis how this can be achieved even with limited data, as well as to identify typical turning points 
in firms’ growth paths.   
Mapping the growth paths of a cohort of new firms 
There are of course many indicators of firm growth: in terms of inputs (employees, investment 
funds), outputs (sales, revenues, profits) and valuation (assets, book value, market capitalisation).  
These measures move out of alignment with each other but the divergences among them are in 
themselves revealing.8  Despite their limitations as measures of firm development, employee 
numbers, the most commonly used indicator, do offer comparable data on the rate and direction in 
which a firm has been expanding.  Comparative growth rates, using any measures adjusted for 
relative size, obscure the paths that firms follow over time9. 
To trace new firms’ growth paths we required time series data for cohorts of firms over a ten-year 
period or so.  We used a database of high technology firms in the Cambridge area10.  There was a 
good deal of turbulence as firms were formed and closed over the ten years (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 - New, Closed, Merged and Moved Firms 1989-200011 
                                                
8 Subsequent work will incorporate data based on a variety of growth measures.  Here we draw on available data on 
employment for a population of high technology firms, and on sales data from case evidence below. 
9 For example: The David Birch Employment Growth Index [Birch, 1987] corrects for firm size by employing the product of 
absolute growth and percentage growth.  However, by reducing growth to a single index it completely obscures the path over 
which the growth takes place. 
10 Cambridgeshire County Council records on the population of high technology firms in the county were used to create a 
database derived from biennial surveys of employment in local firms.  While employee numbers have certain disadvantages as 
a growth measure, they are a standard measure.  The relationship between employment numbers and financial measures varies 
by sector, for instance, service-based firms tend to have lower turnover per employee than firms which generate revenues from 
the licensing of Intellectual Property.  However, since the focus here is on changes in size rather than absolute size, the 
differences are unlikely to have a significant effect on the analysis. 
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However, the analysis of survival or hazard rates (Figure 2) showed that this population of 
Cambridge high technology firms had a relatively good survival performance.  Around 25 per cent 
closed within the first four years, a period of early vulnerability during which many studies show 
around half of a cohort ceasing to trade.  The closure rates for all cohorts of Cambridge high 
technology firms over a decade (45 per cent) compare well with hazard data from other studies.  
Storey [1994] reported 60 per cent of all-sector UK firms ceasing to trade over a decade.  Slatter 
[1992] reported failure rates for high technology firms in the USA of around 66 per cent over ten 
years.  Kirchoff [1994], also in the USA, reported 70 per cent failure over eight years. 
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Figure 2 - Survival of Cambridge High Tech Firms 1989–200012 
Thus, in examining the growth paths of surviving firms in this cohort, we are looking at the more 
successful group of firms within a population with good survival rates, though none of the firms 
show outstanding growth.13  From the available data, we have no reason to expect this group of 
firms to be unusually prone to growth interruptions. 
In principle, there could be as many paths as there are firms, since every firm is historically unique.  
Figure 3 shows growth paths of individual firms which survived over a ten-year period to 
illustrate these variations. 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Calculated from Cambridgeshire County Research Unit (CCRU) records. 
12 Calculated from CCRU records. 
13 A number of Cambridge firms had achieved very high levels of capitalisation by 2001, but the licensing business model of a 
firm like ARM does not entail high levels of local employment – 58 per cent of firms employ less than ten people and less than 
one per cent employ 1000 or more.  Analysis of growth in terms of other growth indicators awaits further data collection and 
database enlargement. 
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Figure 3 - Growth Paths of a Sample of Cambridge High tech Firms started 1989-199014 
We examined the data on an exploratory basis to see if it was possible to summarise trends 
without losing relevant information on comparative growth paths.  In particular we wanted to 
identify growth interruptions and other patterns relating to turning points in the firms’ growth 
paths.   
The data points making up the growth paths provide information that can be compressed in ways 
that are informative.15  For the 93 high technology firms that survived over ten years and remained 
in Cambridge, out of the 237 founded in 1989 and 1990, the compressed growth path data formed 
seven types as shown in Figure 4. 
                                                
14 Calculated from CCRU records. 
15 The data were compressed in two ways.  First, interval scale data were reduced to nominal scale by converting employment 
level to direction of change from previous period.  Data-point paths were coded for growth reduction greater than 5 per cent, for 
increase greater than 5 per cent, and for change in either direction of less than 5 per cent.  In a subsequent compression, the 
resulting measures were coded according to key turning points in evidence.  Growth paths are categorised by dominant turning 
point(s), presented as archetypal growth paths in figure 3.  The Seven archetypes accounted for over 80 per cent of the firms’ 
paths. 
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100% = 93 firms founded c.1990 still active in Cambridge area in 2000 (analysis of CCRU records). 
Figure 4 - Common turning points in growth paths of Cambridge High Tech Firms  
Only six percent of firms grew continuously over the ten years, with another nine percent growing 
continuously after a delay or preparatory period, though another 20 per cent recovered impetus 
after growth interruptions.  Table 1 summarises the information in Figure 4 on 'growth paths' 
classed by turning points for the 93 firms formed around 1990 which survived ten years and 
remained in Cambridge. 
n=93 Growth Path Type All 
  Continuous Interrupted  Curtailed No Growth Archetype Other 
  6% 15% Plateau 11% 14%     
Delayed 
Growth 9% 5% 
Reverse
d 22%       
Total 15% 20%   33% 14% 82% 18% 
Table 1 - Proportion of 93 Cambridge High Tech Firms Surviving Ten Years by Growth Path Type 
Interruptions to growth included not only stalled growth but periods in which growth declined.  
Not shown in the table is that reversal accounted for 79 per cent of the fourteen cases of 
interrupted growth (40 per cent of the five cases of interrupted growth following a slow start).  
Among the firms that survived ten years, over half (54 per cent) had experienced some growth 
reversal (including firms not fitting the archetypes), while 37 per cent had not recovered to their 
previous size level after a period of growth reversal. 
Firms that did not grow were less likely to survive.  Figure 5 shows that as the cohort of firms 
aged, the survivors included fewer firms that had not grown (40 per cent after 2 years to 20 per 
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cent after ten years).  This is consistent with Kirchoff’s findings for high technology firms 
[Kirchoff 1994 p. 184]. 
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Figure 5 - Growth and No Growth by Age of Firm – 1990 Cohort16 
It is possible that in some firms the decision to lay off employees would have been planned and 
desired, e.g. through the sale of a division.  But the evidence on the ill effects on survival 
prospects of failing to grow (Figure 5) suggests that most firms would not have intended cutbacks 
that increased their vulnerability to closure.  A proposition requiring further investigation is that 
most growth reversal is the unintended result of setbacks encountered. 
Comparisons with other populations of firms await investigation.17  The frequency of growth 
interruptions and their implications have been missed in mainstream studies which do not examine 
growth as an on-going, cumulative process.  Thus standard studies of firm growth, which focus 
on cross-sectional data, have not captured potential findings relating to growth paths.  We have 
seen that in this study, over half of the firms with the best survival record experienced growth 
interruptions and a third of these survivors did not subsequently recover to their earlier size.  The 
implications of these growth paths for “Fast Track” indices and associated support and investment 
policies should be explored further.   
To understand turning points of the kind revealed by the data, it is necessary to consider factors 
operating at the level of the firm.  Focussing in particular on growth reversal, we can identify 
various elements of this syndrome from case study evidence.  Space allows us only to examine 
two types of crisis which exemplify mistaken business conjectures and the limits to knowledge:  
                                                
16 The number of firms shown in Figure 5 includes 'other firms' which do not fit the seven archetypes. 
17 In an unpublished study carried out for the UK Department of Trade and Industry on the growth of 22 firms in a wide variety 
of sectors between 1987 and 1965, Hughes provides employment charts which show an early plateau of some kind for all but 
seven cases.  There are two cases of continuous growth, four of reversal in employment (and another of sales reversal), one of 
recovery from interruption and the remainder moving onto a plateau, for the most part without significant growth.  This sample 
is too small and industrially diverse to provide conclusions on growth paths, except to confirm the predominance of the early 
plateau revealed by larger samples [Hughes 1998 p. 75]. 
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1. Firms with good prospects running down resource endowments until forced to close  
2. Firms which, after an early growth record, hit difficulties which throw its growth into 
reverse. 
Exhausting early resource endowments  
A firm which at the time of foundation is believed to have good prospects is well placed to obtain 
resources from investors.  It can grow in terms of input-resources and assets (e.g. the value of 
premises or capital equipment) before it grows in terms of such outputs as revenues and profits.  
By attracting resources it is likely to be in a better position to grow than a firm that depends on its 
own internal funds and revenues for expansion.  But it is also highly vulnerable to the terms on 
which resources were made available. 
The future of any firm cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty and, for this reason, 
investment capital has traditionally been hard to obtain for new firms without a performance track 
record.  Those that obtained funding reflected high hopes for a promising new technology or 
business model, but in the face of limits to knowledge about the future, they remain only hopes.  
For example, Anamartic, a UK semiconductor venture, obtained major support from venture 
capital on the promise of an exciting technology and promising business model [Garnsey and 
Wilkinson 1995].  Problems of developing their technology to the point where it could generate 
revenues in the absence of a strong management team undermined the firm.  Figure 6 shows that 
its revenues failed to take off before its investors withdrew their support.  This involved writing 
off over £20m invested in the venture. 
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Figure 1 Anamartic: Revenue and Cash 1988-1991
 
Source Garnsey and Wilkinson 1995 
Figure 6 - Burning Anamartic’s Resource Endowment 
The CEO of another venture which exhausted its early funds, the hand held computer company, 
GO, succinctly expressed the dangers of accepting funds on the basis of making available equity in 
the firm. 
"How do you like our new offices?…Now we look like a real company…But we're missing one 
thing…Revenues...We look like a company, but we are only a venture.  Ventures have 
investors, while companies have revenues.  Every month we delay a revenue stream, we have 
to sell off more equity to stay alive.  If we delay too long, the price of the equity goes 
down...eventually no one wants to buy..." 
 [Kaplan 1995 p.93]  
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This was to be the destiny of his own enterprise.  Many others were to repeat the fate of these 
start-ups even as a few successful enterprises were fuelling investors’ appetite for returns from 
investment in high growth technology start-ups during the 1990s.  
Kaplan depicted in 1992 exactly the crisis that hit Internet ventures in the speculative boom of the 
millennium.  Firms enjoying a boom in share price were able to buy into real assets sufficiently 
rapidly to grow through acquisition.18  But firms dependent on external capital are highly 
vulnerable to investor disaffection.  If they do not meet early expectations, investors are likely to 
withdraw support in a self-fulfilling response to profit warnings.  An enforced trade sale or 
bankruptcy may be the consequence of this collapse of confidence. 
It may be thought that this was simply the outcome of the unique financial climate of the new 
millennium and miscalculations over the prospects for Internet ventures.  But the danger to 
entrepreneurs of running out of resources had been recognised as endemic by David Packard 
seventy years earlier.  Packard articulated the danger of accepting even bank loans in the view of 
the prospect of an unforeseen crisis.  
"I often helped my father in looking up the records of those companies that had gone 
bankrupt.  I noted that the banks simply foreclosed on firms that mortgaged their assets 
and these firms were left with nothing … The firms that did not borrow money had a 
difficult time, but they ended up with their assets intact and survived ...  From this 
experience I decided our company should not incur any long-term debt.  For this reason 
Bill and I determined we would operate the company on a pay-as-you-go basis, financing 
our growth primarily out of earnings rather than by borrowing money.” 
[Packard 1995 p. 84] 
It is to avoid the ill effects of dependence on outside finance that many entrepreneurs prefer to 
rely on their own resources.  However, the concern with self-reliance leaves them resource-
constrained and thus more likely to plateau early or exhaust their own resources.  Even when the 
firm does not encounter a dramatic growth crisis, the fear of this outcome exerts an influence on 
growth plans and indirectly accounts for the large numbers of new firms that fail to reach the 
point where they can generate revenues, or which plateau early for lack of resources to maintain 
growth. 
Failure to sustain early growth record  
Another category of firms that exemplify limits to knowledge and mistaken business conjectures 
grow rapidly, not only in terms of inputs, like the first group, but also in terms of outputs - 
revenues and profits - only to run into unexpected setbacks.  In these firms, growth has fed further 
growth.  But this process can have perverse effects when it creates resource shortages and 
synchronisation problems.19  If key resources - people, components, premises - cannot be 
renewed at the pace required, output and productivity suffer.  Bottlenecks create delays with 
knock-on effects.20  These growing firms cannot coordinate the resources required.  The cash 
flow crisis is a synchronisation syndrome; if cash returns do not come in fast enough to pay for 
                                                
18 Growth through acquisition of other firms is also subject to Penrosean constraints: planning delays, delays before new staff 
become useful, constraints on decision-makers. 
19 See, for example, data analysed by Harrison and Taylor [1996] for the UK. 
20 See also Garnsey 1998 on growth crises of new firms, with examples. 
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outlays required by the pace of expansion, further productive activity can be halted by lack of 
cash. 
Sometimes problems build up steadily and visibly - as a niche market becomes saturated, for 
example, the order book ceases to grow and no new sources of custom emerge.  More 
insidiously, when rapid growth is underway, feedback may go undetected and reversals can occur 
unexpectedly as an essential resource is exhausted, as in our introductory example.  All aspects of 
growth are interconnected; hence these difficulties may escalate before they are addressed.  From 
a period of successful growth, the enterprise is suddenly faced with a reversal in its fortunes which 
may be so dramatic as to be akin, metaphorically speaking, to a shift in phase state, as in our 
introductory example.  This is particularly likely to occur when industry conditions alter 
unexpectedly while the firm is overstretched. 
Our introductory example described the experience of crisis at Acorn between September 1984 
and March 1985 [Fleck and Garnsey 1988].  In this company, the entrepreneurial founders had 
been outstandingly successful, but were too inexperienced to interpret the evidence on their 
"business experiment" as the impending crisis built up.  There had been a collective effort to gear 
up production to meet the expected 1984 Christmas sales peak, which they had missed in the 
previous year because of a shortfall in output, with the result that demand was deflected onto 
competitors.  A shakeout in the microcomputer industry in the US and warnings of low order 
books and retailers' returns went unheeded.  The shift in mindset required to change direction and 
cut back production was too abrupt.  The assumption that the future will be like the past 
represents a common limit to knowledge. 
The capacity of decision-makers to assimilate knowledge, co-ordinate and plan was identified by 
Penrose as the major internal constraint on growth.  It also plagues attempts to turn around a 
company that runs into growth problems.  Complexity greatly increases the knowledge those in 
charge have to assimilate, slowing the rate at which they can take considered decisions.  What 
information systems exist within the young firm must be in a constant state of change to deal with 
the rapidly evolving internal and external environments.  Co-ordination and planning, together 
with attempts to redress errors, require intensive effort by a select group of people - founders or 
leading managers who have the authority to take decisions for the firm.  
Informal entrepreneurial leadership cannot cope as the firm grows more complex.  New leadership 
requirements are accelerated under rapid growth.  Professional managers from big business lack 
experience of the special problems of young growing firms.  People who know how to institute 
efficient procedures cannot be brought on board fast enough.  This underlies the statistics showing 
that relevant business experience among founders improves performance [cf. Oakey 1994]. 
These firms are subject to limits to intensity of effort.21  In the start-up period, the unmistakable 
impact of individual effort is highly motivating, creating the new venture buzz.  As the 
organisation grows more complex, communication problems set in.  As routines develop, 
repetitive attention to detail is required.  When the excitement of the start-up period fades and 
new procedures are experienced as constraints, motivation and commitment decline [Slatter 
1992].  Overworked staff can suffer burn-out.  Conflict and departures occur.  This often results 
in competitive spin-outs of a new venture by former employees.  Loss of key members of staff can 
be disastrous to firms which still rely largely on tacit knowledge.  Crises are particularly difficult 
to overcome where the whole basis of the firm's activities have to be reconsidered [cf. Argyris and 
                                                
21 This is another dimension of the sigmoid growth curves found in complex systems [Richardson 1991] 
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Schon 1978].  This may require the departures of founders and new forms of leadership which 
may take longer than circumstances allow.22 
Some examples 
The impact of crises can be illustrated from four Cambridge high technology firms with an early 
growth record.  These firms all experienced the kinds of problems examined above, but in three of 
the cases, these were exacerbated by their relationships with external resource providers.   
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Figure 7 - Growth Reversal in Four Cambridge Firms 
Tadpole Technology was founded in 1983.  Figure 7 shows a steady increase in sales until 1991.  
The company achieved a full listing on the UK stock exchange in December 1992 and its shares 
became a favoured speculative stock for over 3,000 small shareholders.  Its sales and profits grew 
rapidly to 1994, when they fell precipitously, just as occurred at Acorn in 1984-85 when demand 
for the BBC computer had not met forecasts and stocks had built up, creating a cash crisis [Fleck 
and Garnsey 1988].  Tadpole’s share price slumped and trading was suspended in the wake of the 
announcement of pre-tax losses of almost £6m by 1995.23  The pressure to provide venture 
capitalists with the chance to realise their assets in the venture had created strong incentives to 
turn to the stock market for funds.  Prior to flotation, profits had been generated mainly in a niche 
market - the provision of specialist computer boards to computer companies, and the production 
of the SPARC notebook.  The need to show substantial profits encouraged managers to move 
                                                
22 David Potter, the founder of Psion believes that early growth crises are a key learning experience.  If the crisis does not 
destroy the firm, the experience “keeps entrepreneurs humble” and makes them more apt to go on learning (interview Dec 
1998).  This was also the experience at Oxford Instruments, as reported in a communication by the founder, Martin Wood.  
23 Financial Times, 12 May 1995. 
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into a broader market, with a new product, the P1000 notebook.  This unfamiliar market proved 
difficult to penetrate and over-optimistic sales forecasts were made.  A drastic sales shortfall, 
coupled with shipping delays on the SPARC product, had disastrous consequences.  This 
sequence was a close repetition of the difficulties which had beset Acorn Computers ten years 
earlier.24  
There are other under-documented examples.  Datapaq Limited, a company producing thermal 
monitoring systems for industry, founded in 1984 was sold to the Quota group in January 1992 
after a setback in sales and profits following early growth.25  Datapaq's founders had accepted an 
early stage joint offer from two venture capitalists for an equity stake of 25%.  This was 
considerably less than the sum they had needed.  Their venture capitalists were in a strong 
bargaining position when a cash flow crisis occurred in 1991.  Additional funds of £100,000 were 
made available, on condition that if the company was not sold within a year, the equity stake 
would be increased to 50%.  Datapaq was acquired the following year and soon recovered its 
sales and profits under new ownership, which sold out a few years later for almost three times the 
sum earlier paid to the founders.  Pressures to sell Datapaq were experienced as the result of a 
change in management at the venture capital firm.  From the new fund managers' point of view, 
the investment of a further £100,000 to liquidate the investment was rational, as they would be 
assessed on returns generated by this £100,000.  The precipitous decline in sales made it 
impossible for the company to generate the profits or external resources required to sustain 
growth, and as at Acorn, this was followed by acquisition.   
Tadpole was unable to find a purchaser and struggled on without regaining its growth impetus.  
Linx Printers, however, recovered after a brief period of sales decline and retained its 
independence.  This company did not run out of cash, incur heavy supply costs or lose the 
confidence of their investors in the manner of the other three companies in Figure 7.   
A better known instance of decline and recovery, at Oxford Instruments in 1967, points to a 
common feature of the growth reversal crisis among UK high technology ventures, over a thirty-
year period [Garnsey, 1998; Wood, 2000].  After a period of successful growth, management and 
technical problems overwhelmed the young company, leading to pressure from their bank to sell 
the company.  A relatively small injection of funding enabled the founders to reorganise the 
company for recovery [Wood 2000]. 
                                                
24 Tadpole had no reserves to tide it over this crisis, in part because their lead investor had refused to provide any subsequent 
funding, and it was believed by some that they would have used any means to exit their investment.  The refusal to provide a 
further round of funding resulted from VC objections to the make-up of the management team.  Other venture capital firms took 
their lead from the current venture capitalist.  This illustrates the extent to which prospects for a firm depend on their relations 
with key resource providers. 
 
25 London Business School Teaching Case on Datapaq, updated by interviews with founder and venture capitalist purchaser. 
Garnsey and Heffernan 2003 CTM WP2003/01 
17 
Oxford Instruments Financial Results
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Source:  data kindly provided by founder Audrey Wood 
Figure 8 - Growth Setbacks Overcome at Oxford Instruments 
These cases are presented to allow more detailed explanation than aggregate data provide for.  
But our aggregate data show that growth setbacks are sufficiently common and significant to 
require that growth models explain growth reversal as a predictable feature of early firm growth 
[Garnsey 1998].  They should not be treated as aberrations, as occurs when the firms which 
encounter setbacks are removed from samples used to track growth. 
External Relationships and Recovery from Growth Setbacks 
In explaining growth setbacks, we have identified internal dynamics and management problems as 
a common set of causes.  But external relations are no less important.  In each of these cases, the 
crisis was caused by delays or breakdown in resource recovery.  When growth faltered, inputs 
were curtailed just when these were essential to restore output performance.  The firms’ 
dependence on their entourage of suppliers, funders, distributors and customers is intensified by a 
cash crisis.    
 
Figure 9 - The Firm’s Entourage 
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In none of the cases illustrated in Figure 7 could the firms have resolved matters on their own.  
Those firms that had failed to establish cooperative relations such that funders, suppliers or 
customers were prepared to help tide them over the crisis were unable to retain their 
independence.  The firms cited that recovered without losing their independence, Linx Printing 
and Oxford Instruments, had created relationships with external parties that saw them through 
their early growth setbacks.  However, external funding is insufficient to ensure longer-term 
recovery unless the companies that negotiate a reprieve are able to reconfigure their activities to 
alter the internal conditions that contributed to the crisis. 
Monitoring Throughput  
Private sector firms in a market economy operate as dissipative systems, that is systems engaged 
in a continual exchange of energy with their environment.  When they require a continuous flow 
of resource inputs because they have no reserves, new firms are highly vulnerable.  Delays or 
bottlenecks in the production and exchange processes can deprive them of the cash they require to 
sustain productive activity.  Moreover new firms often lack sufficient knowledge of resource 
flows through their own system and cannot yet interpret signals from their entourage.  Creating   
and responding to indicators which monitor resource flows is a first step to obtaining the 
knowledge they need.  A classic growth crisis was described by Chandler (1962) in the case of 
General Motors in 1911.  This account of Durant’s shortcomings could have been written about 
entrepreneurs at Acorn Computers in 1984. 
"In carrying out expansion...he never prepared for nor hardly even considered possible a 
temporary decline in demand and so failed to build up his cash reserves.  He made no attempt 
to collect information about output and demand in order to make adjustments in production 
that might prove necessary.  Nor was he interested in building an organisational structure to 
give him information about and control over his operations or to help him achieve potential 
economies...As a result...when sales dropped below scheduled production he lacked funds to 
pay his suppliers and work force..."  
It takes only minor perturbations to block the inflow of resources in irrecoverable ways.  Unless 
they have the knowledge required to anticipate and monitor resource flows, new firms are in 
danger from unexpected setbacks before they can take action to avert them.  Creatively devised 
throughput measures, specifically designed to link the firm’s internal resource flows to changing 
market conditions are needed.  Knowledge of this kind can enable firms to change direction in 
time, as described by the CEO of Intel in relation to the crisis that gripped Intel in 1985.  They 
were able to shift from memory chips into micro-processors in response to information on 
changing margins and demand (Grove 1988).   
Growth crises that reflect industry evolution 
Scalar effects and emergent properties of new industries 
Our analysis highlights how rare it is for new firms that grow substantially.  Those few  new firms 
in which growth reinforces further growth,  for a variety of path dependent reasons,  may sustain 
outstanding performance despite being in an industry where average profits are “unattractive”.  
The skewed distribution of firm size found in many sectors where large firms are scarce and small 
firms very plentiful does not fit the prediction that firms in a given industry can be expected to 
grow to the optimal size for that industry.  The presence of only a very few highly successful 
outliers reflects the way that firms operate, as dissipative systems that are vulnerable to failure, 
especially in their early years.  Firms that overcome initial problems and achieve an early growth 
record are also unusual, even when this performance is not sustained.  The entry of further new 
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firms of small size and attrition rates that prevent more than a few reaching substantial size shape 
size distribution of firms in a sector.  Ten years after a cohort of firms start up, their size 
distribution is highly skewed, with large numbers of them remaining small, fewer reaching medium 
size and very few having become large firms.  The skewed size distribution of firms is spatially 
scale invariant; it is found in the local distribution of firms and at the national level.  The larger the 
size of the firm, the smaller the number of firms in that size category.  Distributions that follow a 
power law are a feature of complexity [Buchanan, 1999 p.40].  
Many attempts have been made to discover whether internal or external factors make a more 
important contribution to new firm growth.  The mainstream literature is divided on the relative 
importance of internal and external factors on growth prospects for a firm.  The approach 
associated with Porter holds that the key factor promoting new firm growth is attractive levels of 
profitability in that industry [Porter 1991].  However other studies have provided evidence 
showing that internal factors are more important than external factors in explaining successful 
growth [Hughes 1998; Stanley et al 1996].  A recent study on firm versus industry effects on 
profitability has examined the performance of exceptional firms in relation to average performance 
for that industry.  This study provides support for the idea that the non-Gaussian distribution of 
firm size in most industries could make it difficult to distinguish firm from industry factors 
contributing to growth in standard variance studies: 
"A significant proportion of the estimates of the variance of firm-specific factors in our 
study is due to the presence of a few exceptional firms in an industry: the two firms that 
outperform their industry and the two that under-perform in comparison with the rest.  The 
majority of studies show that firm-specific factors were more dominant than industry 
effects in explaining firms’ profitability.  But new data show that only for a few dominant 
value creators and destroyers do firm specific factors outweigh industry specific factors." 
[Hawawini et al 2000] 
This might be taken to mean that the majority of firms in an industry are subject to the ebb and 
flow of industry trends, while a few outstanding or incompetent managers steer paths to 
exceptional gains or losses respectively.  However, an industry, as a complex dynamic system, has 
no separate existence from that of its constituent firms, and its properties emerge from the 
activities of those firms, which in turn are the result of the actions of the individuals employed 
within them.  These properties include patterns of adoption of dominant design and the 
development of interactive protocols and other industry standards over time, which impinge back 
on the constituent firms in the industry.  These developments undoubtedly exert strong industry 
level influences on the growth and prospects of individual firms.  Strategies are devised and 
modified in the light of the firm’s objectives and in response to industry and market factors which 
are influenced by the firm and its entourage.  The firm and its industry therefore co-evolve, each 
influencing and being influenced by the other.  If firms create the industry in which they operate, it 
is not surprising to find that the performance of the majority is in line with the industry average.  
There is circularity in the debate as to whether firm or industry factors are more significant in 
determining performance since there are close linkages between internal and external factors.  Co-
variation among firms renders interpretation of the results of analysis of variance problematic.  
Averaging out effects at the lower level of aggregation does not reveal what is bringing about 
aggregate effects that are emergent (relational) properties at the higher level. 
 
The growth process of new firms is closely linked to the evolution of competition in new 
industries, where pioneering firms can have a formative influence.  They may be able to take on 
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technological leadership, shape standards and pre-empt key assets.  Through co-evolution, firms 
impact on each other as competitors or providers of complementary output [Hugo and Garnsey 
2001].  Outstanding new firm growth is associated with pioneering firms drawing early mover 
advantage from the expansion of new sectors and industries.  But pioneers are subject to the 
hazards of uncertainty in an emerging industry without accepted protocols or standards.  For 
many industries, after a period of early growth, a shakeout of firms occurs and consolidation takes 
place [Klepper and Graddy, 1992].  The firms shaken out are often those that failed to lead or 
back emerging technical standards in the industry.  To do so requires awareness of moves by 
competitors, complementary producers and standards regulators (fig 9).New firms growing in 
new industries are particularly vulnerable to this shakeout.  A major factor limiting sales 
expansion for Acorn Computers was its proprietary operating system, incompatible with the 
rapidly diffusing MS-DOS standard. 
Attraction is exerted by technical standards because of the extent to which these facilitate 
exchange and interaction between users and joint solutions to production problems among 
producers.  In a networked industry, such as communications and IT, in which users and 
producers are in close interaction, standards are likely to emerge early.  In industries with 
interactive products and services, standards operate, as it were, as basin of attraction, drawing in 
most firms in the emerging industry through adoption of common standards.  Those firms that fail 
to adopt the standard remain on the periphery of the industry and are particularly vulnerable 
unless they create for themselves a secure niche.  It is unclear early on which standards will come 
to dominate.  This creates advantages to second movers who head for the emerging standard, 
avoiding non-standard variants.  But a few exceptional first movers are able to install very high 
switching costs, protect their IP, and so lock in customers. 
Overheating and Growth Reversal at the Industry Level 
Just as individual firms may make mistaken conjectures, so large numbers of firms may 
miscalculate as new developments in an industry emerge.  For example, in telecommunications a 
‘consensual vision (or cognitive framework)’ shaped the thinking and decision making that drove 
the Telecoms Boom from around 1996-2000.  (A ‘vision’ or cognitive framework consists of an 
interrelated set of beliefs, embodied in assumptions and expectations, which serve the purpose of 
making the world seem intelligible and therefore orienting decision-making’ [Fransman 2001 p.9].  
The central notion in the case of the telecommunications industry was that there would be 
‘explosive demand for bandwidth.’  However the saturation effect of the usual sigmoid diffusion  
curve for new technologies had not been taken into account, so that though there was increase in 
demand it was less than was forecast under the optimistic assumptions of the ‘consensual vision’.  
Nor did this vision take into account the increase in supply stimulated by current predictions of 
profitability.  Barriers to entry had been dramatically lowered by modularisation and the 
commodification of telecoms components which made it possible for new entrants to configure 
innovative offerings (much as had occurred in PC peripherals).  However these companies did not 
have control over unique intellectual property, making them vulnerable to the entry of further 
competitors and so lowering profitability.  
There was a deficiency of information gathering and a lack of integrated analysis taking into 
account developments in the telecoms industry viewed as a dynamic system.  But, Fransman 
points out, there was also inevitable interpretive ambiguity resulting from the uncertainty of future 
demand for bandwidth-intensive applications such as video enabled websites and conferencing.  
Just as individual managers may act in error as a result of the unpredictability of the environment 
they face, so a whole industry may engage in erroneous predictions.  “Mistakes are an inevitable 
consequence of the irreducible uncertainty which always shrouds complex events such as those 
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which occurred in the Telecoms Industry in the Internet Age from 1996-2002 [Fransman 
2002.33].”  
What is striking about growth setbacks in a new industry is the extent to which individual actions 
taken in pursuit of individual interests produced in the aggregate unintended consequences which 
were desired by no one, viz falling profits and overcapacity.  The unintended consequences of 
self-interested and atomised decision-making were not those assumed by Adam Smith.  Since they 
are also employees, citizens and shareholder, any benefits consumers may enjoy in lower costs – 
here of telecommunications service provision – are cancelled out by the unwanted effects of 
recession. 
The Internet boom and crash provides many examples of companies subject to runaway growth 
pressures and of subsequent reversal in growth among many of them at once.  Such effects have 
been experienced before in history.  During the railway boom of the 1840s, small investors 
crowded into the sector drawn by profits achieved by second round investors.  These imitators 
had capitalized on the efforts of pioneering innovators, many of whom had made losses.  The third 
generation of investors saw their funds engulfed in what Marx identified as a crisis of over-
production.  In the past, demand has eventually caught up with previous excess capacity in 
industries based on new technologies. 
“There was huge speculation in railway shares followed by a spectacular crash in 1845 
even in the shares of those companies that would become giants of the industry in later 
decades.  Then as now, stock markets found that pricing shares associated with an exciting 
new technology is extremely difficult, reflecting the considerable uncertainty about the 
value of the technology, both to the economy as a whole and to the shareholders.” 
(Baines et al 2001). 
Conclusion 
New firms in emerging industries are subject to complex dynamic processes which defy attempts 
at prediction embodied in business conjectures   Academic specialisation does not currently 
encourage integrated and systemic analysis.  The internal structure of firms and organisations is 
studied as a specialism distinct from the industry-level approach that prevails in industrial 
structure-based strategy studies and industrial economics.  The literature is dominated by static 
rather than dynamic approaches at both levels.  But entrepreneurs and managers do not have the 
luxury of specialisation.  Entrepreneurial managers must take decisions in relation to both internal 
and external dynamics.  The case studies illustrated the extent to which 
1. There is insufficient information to understand the environment or for investors to 
understand the new firm with an emerging technology.    
2. The pursuit of opportunities before entrepreneurs have the resources required to realise 
them makes them particularly vulnerable to uncertainty. 
3. Firms require a very specific resource mix, and the timing of resource availability is critical.  
Even where growth draws in further resources, the pace of growth may outstrip the 
synchronisation of specialised resources, and the time, competence and knowledge of 
decision-makers. 
4. Industries, like firms, may move abruptly from under to over-capacity.   
In a volatile environment, many of the conjectures and experiments represented by new firms will 
be invalidated by events.  If this occurs within the first few years of the new firm, before sustained 
Garnsey and Heffernan 2003 CTM WP2003/01 
22 
revenues and resource recovery are achieved, the new firm has no reserves to fall back on.  Those 
encountering growth reversal are confronted with what amounts to a sudden shift in phase state, a 
sudden transformation from growth to decline, from shortage of stocks to inventory build-up, 
from confidence bred of success to fear and doubt.  These changes are interlinked and demand a 
radical reconceptualisation of the firm's resources and opportunities.  Those in charge of a firm in 
the throes of a crisis cannot solve these problems in isolation; they must draw on relationships 
with others in their entourage and reconfigure the wider flow of information and resources.   
The prevalence of reversal after a period of growth has wider implications.  Emphasis on rapid 
growth ventures and fast track stars diverts attention from the need to view new firm growth as 
an unfolding process in which the future cannot be extrapolated from the past.  Variance based 
approaches have dominated the literature; more process based work is now needed. 
For individual firms, crises are not always an unmitigated disaster.  New and unexpected problems 
can challenge frames of reference and accelerate learning.26  The overheating of whole sectors 
followed by slump provides an opportunity for public debate on objectives of growth and its 
costs.  There is problem-solving to be done at the collective or policy level.  Higher order 
decision-making can aim at counter-cyclical policies; industry-wide collective action may reduce 
uncertainty.  Just as the lessons of growth reversal at the level of the firm call for 
reconceptualisation of business aims and direction, so accelerated growth followed by slump at 
the industry level call for a public reassessment of the direction and pace of industrial development 
and of the kinds of institutions and policies required to promote new objectives.  Ultimately some 
new consensus on the aims of growth and its limits is needed to replace earlier unfounded 
conjectures.   
 
                                                
26 Psychologists measure learning in terms of adaptive changes in behaviour undertaken in response to experience.  [e.g. 
Evans, 1991] 
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